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ith the continuing slide in the country’s tax
effort1 being blamed largely for the rising
fiscal deficit and tight financial position of
the national government, it is inevitable that
the Philippines’ major tax collection agency—the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR)—is placed at the center of the storm,
so to speak.
Add to this the long-standing and deep-seated problems in
tax administration as well as the perceived corruption that
plagues the agency, and it is no wonder that calls for the
restructuring and even possible replacement of the BIR have
been in the frontline in recent months.
The call for a change and possible replacement of the
country’s tax collection agency is not exclusive, however, to
the Philippines. In the last 15 years or so, there appears to
have been a trend among developing countries towards the
creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities (RAs) to
replace their existing tax collection agencies. From Latin
W
America (Bolivia in 1987, Argentina and Peru in 1988, Co-
lombia in 1991, Venezuela in 1994, Mexico in 1997, Gua-
temala and Guyana in 1999) to Africa (Ghana in 1985,
Uganda in 1991, Zambia in 1993, Kenya in 1995, Tanzania
in 1996, South Africa in 1997, Rwanda in 1998 and Malawi
in 2000) to Southeast Asia (Singapore in 1992 and Malay-
sia in 1994) and even to Europe (Spain in 1991), semi-
autonomous RAs have been created with the intention of
radically improving revenue performance in a landscape of
numerous problems.
But will the creation of a semi-autonomous RA to replace
the BIR in the Philippines help improve the tax collection in
the country? Will it bring about a radical improvement in tax
administration and arrest the decline in the country’s tax
effort?
Two bills are currently pending in the Philippines’ House of
Representatives seeking to establish a semi-autonomous
internal revenue administration to replace the BIR. House
Bill 5054 proposes to create the Internal Revenue Manage-
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ment Authority (IRMA) while House Bill 5465 calls for the
organization of the National Authority for Tax Administration
(NARA). More recently, too, a substitute bill calling for the
establishment of the National Internal Revenue Authority
(NIRA) has passed third reading at the House’s Committee
on Ways and Means.
To help in enlightening the debate and discussion on these
proposed bills and BIR restructuring, this Policy Notes will
review the experiences of other countries that have set up
semi-autonomous RAs and see what lessons may be drawn
from their experiences so that the risks and opportunities
that accompanied their establishment may be carefully stud-
ied amid the Philippine background.
The rationale for change
What brought about the demand for change in the first place?
Tax experts have suggested that in countries where the tax
gap (or the difference between the tax that should be paid
according to tax statutes and the tax that is actually col-
lected) is large, i.e., 40 percent or more of the potential
tax, there is an imperative for radical changes in the tax
administration.
Because tax administration in these countries was ineffi-
cient and perceived to be corrupt due to existing budgetary
and personnel regulations, the argument put forward was
to make the structure and system of tax administration more
“business-like” and free of the financing and personnel rules
that governed the public sector. This would thus reduce the
motive for corruption by giving emphasis to performance-
linked budgets and compensation schemes that would ac-
company the proposed creation of semi-autonomous tax
administration bodies.
In addition, tax scholars have also argued that turning tax
administration over to an independent body would help
depoliticize tax collection and minimize the risks that politi-
cians will undo the reform at a later date. In this sense, for
the establishment of the autonomous tax authority to be
viewed by the public as a means of helping politicians make
a credible commitment to reform, it should be anchored on
specific bureaucratic features of the new tax administra-
tion. For instance, the fact that taxpayers know that the
revenue authority’s budget is a function of revenues col-
lected, that its officials are trained professionals operating
in a meritocratic organization, and that it is headed by some-
one who is free from political interference signals to taxpay-
ers that the new RA has solid incentives to maximize rev-
enue by detecting noncompliance on the part of taxpayers.
Key design features of semi-autonomous RAs
More specifically, what are the key design bureaucratic fea-
tures that define semi-autonomous RAs and that make their
structure acceptable and credible? There are five key ele-
ments, namely:
X legal character. While all the semi-autonomous RAs in
other countries were created by law and situated within
the public sector, they nonetheless took different forms.
For instance, Peru’s RA is a decentralized public orga-
nization while that of South Africa is a public sector
organization outside the public service. That of Kenya
is a government corporate body whereas Venezuela’s
agency is an autonomous institute.
Except for Venezuela’s RA, all of these bodies have their
own separate legal character and can own assets which
strengthen their managerial autonomy. Without their
legal character, the RAs would have been more subor-
dinate to the ministries of finance.
X governance structure. Semi-autonomous RAs may fol-
low either one of two governance models: the chief ex-
ecutive officer (CEO) model or the board of directors
(BOD) model.
In the CEO model, the commissioner or superintendent
is appointed by the president of the republic although
in some cases, he may also be appointed by the minis-
ter of finance. His appointment may be for a fixed or
variable number of years.
Under the BOD model, on the other hand, the board is
responsible for overseeing the RA’s management but
does not intervene in the day-to-day activities. The boards
vary in size, composition and appointing authority.No. 2003-12 3
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In terms of size, it may be advisable to keep the num-
ber small because a large board tends to be more un-
wieldy in terms of managing schedules. With regard to
membership, meanwhile, opening the board to repre-
sentatives from the private sector may enhance the RA’s
customer service orientation but this may also give rise
to potential conflicts of interest and breach of taxpayer
confidentiality. As to the appointing authority, studies
by the World Bank (2002) indicate that presidential
appointment of the commissioner is a mechanism that
seems to increase autonomy especially if accompanied
by a fixed-term appointment for the commissioner.
X financing. Semi-autonomous RAs generally receive
budgets that are set as fixed or variable percentages of
their actual collections. Clearly, having the RA budget
as a fixed percentage of actual tax collections is au-
tonomy-enhancing. The practice also tends to enhance
revenue performance since it provides the authority with
more incentive to collect taxes efficiently.
At the same time, however, how the funds are released
to the revenue authority also determines to a large ex-
tent, the autonomy of the authority. Needless to say, a
system whereby formula-based funding is released au-
tomatically to the RA would be the most autonomy-en-
hancing procedure.
X personnel systems. Autonomy in hiring, firing, re-
warding and motivating the staff is viewed by many as
perhaps the most critical feature of semi-autonomous
RAs. The semi-autonomous RA of Peru, for instance,
was given by law the authority to adopt a nonpublic
sector personnel regime where it can set its own salary
structure, and appoint and remove
employees without the need to con-
sult with any other public sector
entity. As such, it worked well in
the Peruvian context.
X accountability mechanisms.
Based on the principle that the best
strategy against corruption is a
combination of both positive and
negative incentives, greater administrative and finan-
cial independence should therefore be accompanied by
the establishment of accountability mechanisms in the
semi-autonomous RAs. The components of a good ac-
countability system are: (1) code of ethics for all em-
ployees of the RA, (2) a strong internal audit unit with a
high profile within the authority, (3) independent exter-
nal audit of the revenue authority itself, and (4) clear
reporting relationships to other government agencies.
The experiences of other countries:
not all semi-autonomous RAs are created equal
On the basis of the above features, what has been the ex-
perience of other countries in terms of the creation of semi-
autonomous RAs?
On the one hand, a survey conducted in 1998-1999 in four
countries in Latin America by Taliercio (2000) shows that
semi-autonomous revenue authorities have had uneven im-
pact not only in combating corruption (Table 1) but also in
improving taxpayer services (Table 2). On the other hand,
the record of these semi-autonomous RAs in improving tax
effort is mixed.
In some countries, the tax-to-GDP ratio rose dramatically
with the establishment of the new revenue authority. This is
the case in Peru where the ratio rose from nine percent in
1987 to 15 percent in 1997 and in Uganda where tax effort
surged from four percent of GDP in 1990 to 11 percent in
1996.
In other countries like Venezuela and South Africa, however,
the increase in tax effort was more modest with the tax-to-
GDP ratio rising by two to three percentage points of GDP
Table 1. Proportion of respondents opining on whether there is more
or less corruption in the tax agency than before the reform (in percent)
Much Substantially Slightly No Slightly Substantially Much
less less less change more more more
Peru 52 33 10 0 0 0 4
Mexico 4 17 34 36 6 0 2
Venezuela 8 18 53 18 0 0 4
Bolivia 2 6 18 48 16 6 4October 2003 4
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after the reform. In yet other countries, the improvement
was marginal as in Mexico and Argentina where the ratio
rose by about one percentage point of GDP only. Meanwhile,
in some countries like Zambia, the new RA appeared to
have no tangible impact on tax effort at all.
Perhaps noteworthy to mention is the fact that even in many
of the countries that have shown some degree of success
in their RAs, the gains in revenue performance seem to
have been eroded after some time. The experiences of Bo-
livia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela show that the semi-au-
tonomous RAs have been less sustainable than expected.
What seems to be the reason for this trend and for the
mixed review of experiences of the various countries that
have set up semi-autonomous RAs?
The general conclusion is that the success of these RAs
declines as their autonomous features are undermined, if
not totally eliminated. Taliercio (2001) claims that the main
challenge to the autonomy of the RA has been the govern-
ment itself (working through the ministry of finance) inas-
much as the very design of these RAs gives rise to the
“dynamics of conflict and competition between the govern-
ment and the RA.”2
Lessons for the Philippines: doing it right
through the proposed bills
As shown in the experiences of other countries, some RAs
perform better than others. And the more successful ones
appear to be those that have a higher degree of autonomy
(as defined in the key design features of the semi-autono-
mous RAs) and have sustained such through the years.
_______________
2He notes that the reform vests “the minister of finance with high
costs, yet provides little in the way of benefits. From a political perspec-
tive, the main benefit of reform is greater revenues. Yet, it is largely the
president, not the minister, who benefits politically from greater expen-
ditures. The main costs of the RA reform are lost patronage opportuni-
ties, less political control of the tax agency, and less influence over tax
policymaking. The minister is affected by all these costs as the RA re-
form removes a large percentage of ministerial employees from his con-
trol (which results in a substantially decreased budget), reduces his po-
litical control over the tax administration, and reduces his tax policy
control by establishing another center of tax policy expertise. According
to this simple cost-benefit analysis, ministers should generally have in-
centives to oppose the reform (even while presidents support it). Thus,
on both administrative and political grounds, finance ministers are likely
to oppose semi-autonomous RAs.
With the proposed bills at the Philippines’
House of Representatives creating the
semi-autonomous RA in the country, it is
imperative to take stock of the experi-
ences of other countries and “do it right”
insofar as the adoption of an autonomous
RA model for the Philippines is concerned.
”Doing it right” implies that the new tax
agency should be vested with strong au-
tonomy-enhancing features and account-
ability mechanisms. Using this framework, Table 3 reviews
the provisions of the three alternative bills pending in Con-
gress to replace the BIR and suggests certain areas, includ-
ing new features, for improvement as ideal.      
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Table 2. Proportion of respondents opining on whether overall quality
of services provided by the tax agency is better or worse than that
provided before the reform (in percent)
Much Generally Slightly No Slightly Generally Much
worse worse worse change better better better
Peru 0 0 2 2 25 44 27
Mexico 0 2 2 38 42 16 0
Venezuela 0 0 8 4 40 35 13
Bolivia 0 0 6 28 46 18 2No. 2003-12 5
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Table 3. Key features of alternative house bills proposing to create new revenue authority
Key design feature House Bill 5054 House Bill 5465 Substitute bill Ideal
New agency name Internal Revenue National Authority National Internal Revenue
Management Authority for Tax Administration Authority (NIRA)
(IRMA) (NARA)
Legal features
Legal character separate legal character separate legal character separate legal character separate legal character
Patrimony can own assets and create can own assets and create can own assets and create can own assets and create liabilities to be
liabilities liabilities liabilities to be used solely for used solely for the improvement of its
the improvement of its capital capital and infrastructure needs
and infrastructure needs
Governance structure
Governance model board of directors model board of directors model board of directors model board of directors model
BOD membership 4 government representatives 5 government representatives 4 government representatives 3 ex officio government representatives
(ex officio) and 3 private (ex officio) and 4 private (ex officio) and 3 private (DOF, DBM and NEDA) and 4 full time
sector representatives sector representatives sector representatives private sector representatives;
Commissioner as nonvoting member
Appointment of BOD appointment by president for appointment by president for appointment by president for appointment by president for a period of
members a period of 3 years with a period of 3 years with a period of 3 years with 5 years with possibility of reappointment
possibility of reappointment possibility of reappointment possibility of reappointment once
once once once
Appointment of appointment by board for a appointment by board for a appointment by board for a appointment by Board for a period of 5
commissioner period of 3 years with period of 3 years with period of 4 years with years with possibility of reappointment
possibility of reappointment possibility of reappointment possibility  of reappointment depending on performance once
depending on performance depending on performance depending on performance;
but limited to a maximum of but limited to a maximum of no term limit
3 terms 3 terms
Functions of the board board tasked with making policies
governing the operations of the authority
Functions of the commissioner tasked with implementing
commissioner policies set by the board and administering
day-to-day operations of the revenue
authority
Financing mechanism
Source of funds between 1% and 2% of actual between 1% and 2% of actual 2% of actual tax collections in 1.5% of actual collections in the previous
tax collections; 5% of excess tax collections;  5% of excess the previous year plus 5% of year
over target over target annual collection in excess of
its target
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Key design feature House Bill 5054 House Bill 5465 Substitute bill Ideal
Transfer of funds congressional appropriation congressional appropriation automatic appropriation/ automatic appropriation/ release
release
Personnel system
establishment of human Own human resource Own human resource organizational structure, Own human resource management system
resource management management system (hiring, management system (hiring, compensation/position (hiring, transfer, promotion, dismissal, pay
system and oversight of  transfer, promotion, transfer, promotion, dismissal, classification scheme, and position classification) promulgated
the same dismissal, pay and position pay and position classification) qualification standards and by board and administered/implemented
classification) promulgated by promulgated by commissioner; performance-based by commissioner; final appellate authority
commissioner; final appellate final appellate authority in management system in cases involving promotion, transfer,
authority in cases involving cases involving promotion, governing selection, hiring, assignment
promotion, transfer, transfer, assignment rests with appointment, transfer,
assignment rests with board Board promotion and dismissal of
personnel set by the board;
appointment and deployment
of personnel in accordance
with Civil Service Law
Recruitment of no preferential or prior right preferential absorption of BIR preferential absorption of BIR no preferential or prior right shall be given




Strong internal audit yes yes yes; deemed deputized by yes; deputized by Office of Ombudsman;
unit Office of Ombudsman; tasks to conduct periodic lifestyle checks of
to conduct periodic lifestyle personnel
checks of personnel
External audit no mention no mention no mention Periodic third party performance audit by
entity to be identified by the Board; financial
audit by COA
Code of ethics no mention no mention no mention Board should establish and implement a
written code of ethics for all employees
Clear reporting rules as indicated in Section 20 of as indicated in Section 20 of in addition to requirements in addition to requirements indicated in
NIRC NIRC indicated in Section 20 of Section 20 of NIRC, submission of annual
NIRC, submission of annual and semi-annual report to Senate and
and semi-annual report to House of Representatives; abolish
Senate and House of Congressional Oversight Committee; no to
Representatives and to Joint Congressional Revenue Commission
Congressional Oversight
Committee; in the first 3 years
from  effectivity of the Act,
Joint Congressional Revenue
Commission to review reports
and evaluate implementation
of Authority
Separation benefits gratuities and benefits under separation incentives over and separation incentives over and separation incentives over and above
existing laws above gratuities and benefits above gratuities and benefits gratuities and benefits under existing laws;
under existing laws under existing laws; package package not to exceed 1.5  months per
equal to 3 months for every every month of service
year of service
Transitory provision all incumbent personnel in all incumbent personnel in all incumbent personnel in pending the organization of new Authority,
BIR as of date of approval of BIR as of date of approval BIR as of date of approval of all incumbent personnel of BIR shall
act shall continue to exercise of act shall continue to act shall continue to exercise continue to exercise their duties and
their duties and function as exercise their duties and their duties and function as functions as personnel of BIR (not as
personnel of the Authority function as personnel of the personnel of the Authority personnel of Authority)
Authority